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Abstract 
 
In 2006, Stephen Harper boldly pronounced Canada as an “emerging energy 
superpower” to a variety of international audiences, including at the G8 meeting 
in London. While this label is likely more representative of a marketing campaign 
than reality (Hester, 2007), it is important to understand the degree to which the 
Canadian media has embraced it. This paper determines the extent to which 
Canada’s national newspapers, the Globe and Mail and the National Post, and 
its largest paper, the Toronto Star, adopted the “energy superpower” frame in 
their reporting about Alberta’s oil sands over a 25-month period.  The oil sands 
were selected as a case study because proponents of Canada as an “energy 
superpower” cite the development of Alberta’s oil sands as a key component of 
the country’s new-found status.  To discover how this new label was intertwined 
into the broader discourse on oil sands development, I used content and 
discourse analysis to examine newspaper stories over 300 words in length that 
contain “oil sands” or “tar sands” in the lead paragraph and/or headline.  While 
my study found few instances of news stories containing the term, it did find 
that these newspapers more closely adopted Harper’s underlying ideas about 
what an energy superpower is than the more activist government traditionally 
associated with the term.1
Introduction 
 
The Alberta oil sands are awe-inspiring in their size.  To their proponents, the oil sands are a 
technological marvel, a source of great wealth, and at least a partial solution to our future 
energy needs.  To their opponents, the oil sands represent the “bottom of the barrel” and a sure 
sign that the world’s addiction to oil trumps other concerns, particularly environmental ones.  
Within this polarized context, Prime Minister Harper (2006b) boldly proclaimed in his first 
international speech that Canada was becoming an “energy superpower.”  Harper uses the term 
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primarily as a marketing slogan to promote the oil sands as a great place to invest.  This is a very 
different usage than its root “superpower” would suggest.  As coined by William Fox, a 
“superpower” was a “super-state that could match its contemporaries with equal force on a 
global scale” (Hester, 2007: 2).  As Hester (2007) details, energy superpowers are countries that 
have significant control over their vast energy resources (including oil) and are able and willing 
to assert this power to control prices or achieve other political objectives.  Using these criteria, 
Hester argues that Canada is not on the path to becoming an energy superpower.  Behind both 
Harper’s and Hester’s definitions are a set of ideas about the role of private enterprise in 
developing oil production capacity, the appropriate role of government in controlling a strategic 
energy resource, and the appropriate place for foreign interests (e.g., the U.S. and China) in oil 
sands development.  Harper’s “energy superpower” is a country that has largely divested 
responsibility for the development of its energy resources to the private sector whereas Hester’s 
definition calls for a more activist government.   
Since the media can never “mirror” reality, it is important to understand how the media “frame” 
an issue as they determine “what is included, what is excluded, what is seen as salient and what 
is regarded as unimportant” (Trimble et al., 2008: 2).  I used content and discourse analysis to 
track how the Globe and Mail, the National Post, and the Toronto Star covered oil sands 
development over a 25-month period. These papers were selected because of their agenda-
setting role at the national level (Nesbitt-Larking, 2007; Taras, 2001).  The Star is also thought to 
be more “left” leaning than both the Globe and the Post.   I began by determining whether these 
influential newspapers actually used the phrase “energy superpower” when exploring issues 
related to oil sands development.  Because I found that the term was used only a few times by 
the press, I explored in greater detail whether the media embraced the set of ideas 
underpinning Harper’s energy superpower definition or Hester’s by exploring the following 
questions.  Did the media present the oil sands as a good place to invest?  How did they frame 
the private sector role vis-à-vis government?  How did the media frame Canada’s relationship 
with the United States? With China? My findings show that despite the fact that they rarely used 
the term, “energy superpower,” the Canadian national newspapers and the Toronto Star 
reproduced many of Harper’s key storylines.  In particular, they sold the idea that the oil sands 
were “open for business.”  As such, they conversely rejected Hester’s notion of energy 
superpower, which calls for a more aggressive form of state-control over energy development.  
Hester’s definition of an energy superpower perceives the reliance on a single market as 
problematic.  Again, the media leaned more closely to Harper’s view that the U.S. represents the 
natural market for Canadian crude.  Evidence for this was found both in the coverage of the U.S. 
but also in their coverage of the perceived Chinese “invasion.”  
The Alberta oil sands 
Canada has significant energy resources from conventional oil and gas, hydroelectric, coal, and 
uranium.  However, it is Alberta’s oil sands, with its estimated 174 billion barrels of recoverable 
oil, which has been fuelling Canada’s economy.  Located in north-eastern Alberta, the oil sands’ 
deposits cover more than 140,000 km2 area or an area larger than the state of Florida 
(Government of Alberta, 2009). As a non-conventional source of oil, the oil sands require 
extensive upgrading to be converted into a useable form.2 As such, the oil sands have always 
been a high cost producer.  Currently, the oil sands companies are producing 1.3 million barrels 
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per day (mbd) which is scheduled to rise between 2.3 mbd to 6.3 mbd by 2035 (IHS CERA, 2009: 
ES-8 to ES-9).  Between 2000 and 2008, over 150 billion Canadian dollars were spent on oil sands 
development, with 80% of this expenditure occurring domestically (IHS CERA, 2009: I-5).  Prior 
to the recent global recession which saw oil prices collapse from $147 per barrel to the $40 to 
$60 range (IHS CERA, 2009: ES-6), potential brakes to this explosive growth were shortages of 
skilled labour and materials which resulted in rapid inflation.  The ability to attract a skilled 
workforce was compounded by the severe housing shortage and other infrastructure challenges 
facing the host community, Fort McMurray.  Longer-term challenges are the amount of water 
consumed (2 to 4 barrels of water per barrel of bitumen), the level of greenhouse gas 
emissions3
The Harper government’s “emerging energy superpower” thesis 
, and the amount of natural gas used by the industry.  
In Prime Minister Harper’s first “energy superpower”4
Canada is the only non-OPEC country with growing oil deliverability.  And let’s 
be clear.  We are a stable, reliable producer in a volatile unpredictable world.  
We believe in the free exchange of energy products based on competitive 
market principles, not self-serving monopolistic political strategies.  That’s why 
policymakers in Washington – not to mention investors in Houston and New 
York – now talk about Canada and continental energy security in the same 
breath.  That’s why Canada surpassed the Saudis four years ago as the largest 
supplier of petroleum products to the United States.  And that’s why industry 
analysts are recommending Canada as ‘possessing the most attractive 
combination of circumstances for energy investment of any place in the 
world.’...And I think we’ll see even more British investment as word of Canada’s 
stature as the West’s most important energy storehouse gets out (Harper, 
2006b: 7-8). 
 speech to the Canada-UK Chamber of 
Commerce, Harper likened the development of the Alberta oil sands to building the Great Wall 
of China or the pyramids.  The focus of Harper’s talk was to promote the Canadian energy sector 
as a desirable place for British investment: 
In short, Harper argued that Canada is a safe, reliable place to invest and to gain access to the 
large insatiable U.S. market.   During the 25-month study period, he then promoted the idea of 
Canada as an emerging energy superpower to a variety of international audiences – New York in 
September 2006 and again in September 2007, Berlin in June 2007, Santiago in July 2007, 
Sydney in September 2007, and lastly one more time in London in May 2008.  Beginning with 
the Sydney speech, Harper added the word “clean” to his invocation of Canada as an energy 
superpower: 
Because we’re a politically stable country with a transparent regulatory system 
and a commitment to open markets, we are recognized as a major contributor 
to global energy security.  Canada is an emerging energy superpower.  But our 
real challenge and our real responsibility is to become a clean energy 
superpower (Harper, 2007a: 5) 
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Afterwards, he listed the variety of programs and initiatives that the Conservative government 
was pursuing to make this claim a reality.  The addition of the word “clean” and inclusion of 
details about his government plans was likely an attempt to buffer international disapproval of 
Canada’s failure to meet its Kyoto targets, and his government’s admission that it would not 
even try to do so.  
On a few occasions, Harper did promote the idea of Canada as an emerging energy superpower 
to a domestic audience most notably in a Canada Day speech in 2007.  However for the most 
part, it was the Minister of Natural Resources, Gary Lunn, who was left to sell the idea to 
Canadians.  Before numerous audiences in a variety of locations, Minister Lunn repeatedly 
labelled Canada as an emerging energy superpower (Lunn 2008, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c, and 2006).  
Becoming a “clean energy superpower” was often presented as the next challenge that the 
government was actively working towards.  The last instance of Minister Lunn using the term 
was at the Newfoundland and Labrador Oil and Gas Industries Association conference in June 
2008.  On one occasion, Environment Canada asserted that Canada is an energy superpower.  In 
Climate change plan for the purposes of the Kyoto Protocol Implementation Act – 2007, the 
ministry states: 
Canada is an energy superpower and one of only a few industrialized countries 
that is a net exporter of coal, oil, and natural gas and has large reserves of each.  
This gives Canada a major role in the long term energy security of North 
American and world energy supplies . . . Canada is seen as one of the few secure 
places in the world to invest in energy development, and one of a very few 
energy exporting nations that has reserves sufficiently large to provide a secure 
long term supply of fossil-fuels (1). 
As recently as August 2010, Prime Minister Harper reiterated the claim that Canada was 
“becoming” a clean energy superpower (Harper, 2010). 
In addition to marketing the Canadian energy sector as a good place to invest, one can also 
discern an additional objective to promote Canadian energy resources as integral to North 
American and even sometimes global energy security.  Under this perspective, Canada should be 
a major player, particularly in designing a post-Kyoto world.  
Is Canada really an energy superpower as the Harper government has been telling the world?  
Critics reject the idea that simply having an abundant quantity of energy resources is sufficient 
to make a nation into an energy superpower.  As such, they argue that Canada is not on a path 
to becoming one.  A more apt description would be that Canada is really an American energy 
satellite (Clarke, 2009), an energy superstore (McCarthy quoted in Clark 2009 and Hester, 2007) 
or an energy pussycat (McQuaig quoted in Clark 2009 and Hester, 2007).  The section below 
explores the history of the term “energy superpower” and determines whether it should be 
applied to Canada. 
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As an energy superpower, a country must have some special capabilities which it shares with 
other energy superpowers and which non-members of this exclusive club do not have.  Being an 
energy exporter, even a large one, is not enough.  As Hester notes this label has not been 
applied by media or academics in the public realm to Saudi Arabia despite its status as the 
world’s largest oil producer (2007: 3).  To be an energy superpower, a country must not only 
have enough control over its abundant natural resources to be a price setter but also be willing 
and able to use this power to extend its influence beyond a regional market to a global one 
(Hester, 2007: 4).  At times, OPEC has met this test (e.g., the 1970s oil crisis).  However, for the 
most part, even OPEC has had difficulty in setting prices by matching production quotas to 
consuming countries’ economic cycles (ibid).  High energy prices bring the development of 
unconventional oil online, encourage the development of alternative fuels, and reduce overall 
demand – thus even an energy superpower’s ability to raise prices is limited.  In addition, 
“bullying” tactics, like pipeline shutoffs, can also lead consuming countries to seek alternative, 
more stable, sources (Monaghan, 2007: 286).  Energy producing countries are also likely 
dependent on the revenue.  The “most credible” and perhaps the “only” energy superpower is 
Russia who could combine its control over vast energy resources with its military power status 
(Rutland, 2008).  However, at best, Russia’s influence is regional as opposed to global and it has 
had difficulty in translating its energy resources into either hard or soft influence (Rutland, 2008; 
Monaghan, 2007; Milvov 2007; Hester 2007).  For example, Rutland notes that despite 
subsidized energy prices, Belarus is increasingly “hostile” towards Russia. In addition, Russia’s 
hard tactics towards Ukraine, shutting down a pipeline for a few days and increasing prices, 
produced condemnation both within the Ukraine and from western countries.  Instead of 
restoring Russia’s position on the world stage, energy superpower terminology is now seen as 
being “counterproductive” and Putin has abandoned the use of the term (Monaghan, 2007: 
286). 
Hester (2007) provides the most comprehensive treatment in testing the term against the 
Canadian case.  Hester argues that Canada falls short of “energy superpower” status in three 
important ways (9).  First, Canada lacks a national energy plan.  A significant but not an 
insurmountable barrier to developing a national energy plan is the fact that provinces have 
ownership of and management authority over the natural resources found within their 
territories.  While the federal government currently does not have a national energy plan, it has 
and continues to play a key role in the fostering the development of the oil sands.5  For 
example, the Trudeau government was instrumental in the creation of Syncrude, originally 
holding a 15% share.  The federal government further supported the oil sands by favourable 
taxation rules (e.g., $583 million tax expenditure6 for the period of 1996 to 2002) (Pigeon, 2003: 
1).  The federal government is often seen as supporting the growth of the oil sands by failing to 
use all of its powers (House of Commons, 2007).   Even stricter environmental regulations (for 
example, the Liberal government’s Kyoto plan or Harper’s “Made in Canada” plan) would have 
little impact on the pace of overall development. 7  As such, the most discernible federal policy 
objective, throughout both Liberal and Conservative governments, has been an overt pro-
development policy. 
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When critics, like Pratt (2001), lament Canada’s lack of national energy plan, it is most often 
from the perspective that Canada has largely divested itself of the right to control the amount 
and type of exports to the United States, potentially putting Canada’s needs second to that of 
the U.S.  This was Hester’s second point.  Canada’s relationship with its largest customer, the 
United States, is one of institutionalized deregulation (Clarke 2009; Pratt, 2001).  NAFTA’s 
proportionality clause (Article 315) limits the Canadian government’s ability to restrict exports.  
A second clause (Article 605) binds energy exporting companies to maintain the normal ratio 
among specific energy goods.  For example, a company could not substitute “a heavier grade of 
crude oil for a lighter grade” (Clarke, 2009: 138).   
Third, Canadian governments have divested themselves of the last vestiges of direct ownership, 
as a result the Canadian oil and gas sector is now owned by the private sector and foreign state-
owned companies (Hester, 2007).8  This was part of the larger neoliberal trend— to get 
government out of the way of business—influencing Canadian governments.  However, not 
noted by Hester, was the federal government’s apparent desire to manage the sale of Canadian 
assets to foreign state-owned firms when it strengthened the review criteria in 2007.9  Their 
concern appeared to be directed at the Chinese as opposed to other state-owned firms like 
Norway’s Statoil.10  When seeking investment opportunities in 2007, Chinese officials even 
publicly accused the Conservative government of giving them a “chilly reception” (Harding, 
2007: FP1; Scott, 2007: A1; Ebner, 2006c: B1).  However, the situation appears to have changed 
with the “political rapprochement between Ottawa and Beijing.”  The Chinese have now made 
some significant investments.  In 2009, PetroChina acquired a 60% stake, roughly equal to three 
billion barrels, in two oil sands projects of Athabasca Oil Sands Corporation.11  In 2010, Sinopec 
brought a 9% share in Syncrude.  Up until this point, the Chinese had only made token 
investments (small leases and some limited partnerships) in the oil sands.12
For all of these reasons, the federal government not only lacks the means to control “the 
resources enough to be able to effectively leverage them for political purpose” but also, as 
Hester argues, “appears not to aspire to achieve such control” (2007: 10).  Again, Harper 
promotes this unwillingness to take control as a virtue when marketing the oil sands to 
international investors.  Hester questions the motivations behind Harper’s claim that Canada 
was becoming an energy superpower – was it simply to attract more investment to what was an 
overheated Albertan economy, as she failed to find a discernible foreign policy objective.  
 
If the media embraced the underlying set of ideas behind Hester’s definition, one would expect 
to find support for a more activist government who would be willing to limit exports of Canadian 
crude if necessary to obtain other political objectives.  As an intermediary step, one would 
expect the media to embrace efforts to diversify markets, renegotiate NAFTA’s energy clauses, 
and keep refining capacity within Canada.  However, as discussed in the section below it would 
be unlikely that Canada’s newspapers would adopt this perspective; as private, profit-seeking 
enterprises, they tend to uphold the values of a free market. 
Oil sands and the news 
If one accepts the “energy superpower” thesis, the oil sands are perceived as changing Canada’s 
status on the world stage.  As well, the oil sands are seen as the primary driver shifting the 
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economic power of the country westward.  Due to its level of investment, its environmental 
impacts, and its impact on other regions and industries, the oil sands have become a national 
news story.13
As Taras (2001) argues media are “our central public squares” where the public come to “know” 
about policy issues, political interests, and governing institutions.  This is particularly true for 
issues with which the reader has no direct experience.  The majority of readers of the national 
newspapers or the Toronto Star have neither direct experience with oil sands development nor 
acquaintance with the area. If the media simply “mirrors” reality, this would not be a problem.  
However, since most important issues are multi-dimensional with many different angles, the 
media “frames” issues by promoting  a pre-existing storyline promoted by political elites, 
unearthing a dormant or alternative one, or “creating their own thematic interpretations” 
(Terkildsen and Schnell, 1997: 882). The media limit our thinking about the issues that they 
choose to cover as they bestow visibility and legitimacy on some opinions and illegitimacy to 
others (Nesbitt-Larking, 2001; Sherman and Gismondi, 1997). 
   
In addition to the general “newsworthy” characteristics of an event like timeliness or conflict, 
news is shaped by the broader underlying values of society.  For the purposes of this paper, the 
most important are the economic values of free enterprise and a free market (Jaap van 
Ginneken as referenced by Lorimer et al., 2007: 242).  Often, but not exclusively, this leads 
media to apply a “business filter” to public policy issues. A greater range of stories are being told 
about business’ interests as opposed to the interests of other societal groups (e.g., labour, 
environmentalist) and the stories about businesses are more likely to be positive (Hackett and 
Gruneau, 2000; Simons 1999).  As such, the media are more likely to embrace Harper’s version 
of Canada as an energy superpower, as it invokes an image of Canada as a good place to invest, 
rather than Hester’s version, which calls for more direct government involvement in the energy 
industry.  
Methodology 
This paper examines news stories pertaining to the Alberta oil sands in the Globe and Mail, the 
National Post and the Toronto Star.14  Stories over 300 words in length which contained the 
words “oil sands/oilsands” or “tar sands/tarsands” in the lead paragraph and/or headline15 from 
October 1, 2005 to October 31, 2007 were selected for analysis.16  A total of 684 articles were 
analyzed – 331 articles in the Globe, 287 in the Post, and the 66 in the Star.  Male reporters 
wrote the majority of the news articles, although the Post had a higher percentage written by 
female reporters17 (38% compared to the Globe’s 10% and the Toronto Star’s 20%).  This was 
due to the presence of the Post’s Calgary Bureau Chief, Claudia Cattaneo, who wrote numerous 
hard news articles and columns.  Oil sands stories were considerably more likely to be included 
in the business section than any other section (90% in the Post, 84% in the Globe, and 70% in 
the Star).  All newspapers predominately presented the oil sands story as a hard news story 
(82% in the Globe, 77% in the Star, and 73% in the Post) with the second most popular format 
was that of a column or commentary (17% in the Post, 16% in the Globe, and 11% in the Star).  
Lastly, most stories were written out of Calgary (64% in the Globe, 62% in the Post and 42% in 
the Star).   
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In addition to mapping out the placement of oil sands stories in the newspaper, content analysis 
also determined a variety of other factors including the frame, main actors, and portrayal of oil 
sands development.  To compliment and add richness to this quantitative methodology, I 
employed discourse analysis (Burnham et al., 2004).  My purpose was to identify dominate 
frames and ideas, to understand how these sets of ideas were organized, and to discover which 
actors legitimized those ideas. 
Findings: Energy superpower – a contested idea 
The newspapers used the term “energy superpower” infrequently — only one time in the 
Toronto Star, three times in the National Post and eight times in the Globe and Mail.  In “Part 1” 
below, I deconstruct the media’s usage of this term. 
Despite this fact, the study did capture many of the issues raised when either supporting or 
rejecting the emerging energy superpower thesis.  Most notably, elements within the economic 
and energy security frames directly address this debate.  Does Canada have or need a national 
energy strategy?  Did the media promote the idea of oil sands as a good, reliable place to invest 
as Harper marketed Canada when using the energy superpower idea with international 
audiences?  How did the media present Canada’s relationship with the United States? With 
China?  These questions are explored in “Part 2.” 
Part 1: Use of the term “energy superpower” 
The media both embraced and rejected the “energy superpower” claim.  In this selected sample, 
the media used the term “energy superpower” in one of three ways 
1. A “matter of fact” inclusion (2 articles) 
2. a) Supportive of the term being applied to Canada by actively claiming that 
Canada was or is becoming an energy superpower (2 articles) 
b) Supportive of the concept but critical that government had not done enough 
to achieve it (2 articles) 
3. Critical of government applying the term to Canada (6 articles) 
1. A “matter of fact” inclusion (2 articles) 
Instances in this category include news stories that mentioned but did not directly address the 
term, for example, “Federal Natural Resources Minister Gary Lunn also addressed the 
conference, where he sought to spotlight Canada’s role as an energy superpower” (McCarthy, 
2006: B1).  This category is important because it shows that the term was accepted as fact or 
was straightforward to the reader, therefore needing no explanation, support or criticism. 
2. Supportive of the term being applied to Canada (4 articles) 
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Instances in this category are supportive of the term.  Direct evidence was used to bolster this 
claim in two of the articles. For example, “such growth (4 mbd by 2020) would make Canada one 
of the world’s most significant oil producers and underscores Prime Minister Harper’s 
declaration that Canada is an emerging “energy superpower” (Ebner, 2006: B1).  The other type 
of story is supportive of the term but critical that the government had not followed through in 
making it a reality.  In a regular column, the Patch, Cattaneo (2007a) lauded the government’s 
plan to become an “energy superpower” yet worried that it was being abandoned in search of 
eastern votes (FP2).  In a later column (2007b), she called on the government to stop using the 
term because she felt it had abandoned its objectives all together: 
The notion (energy superpower) may have seemed catchy a couple of years ago, 
when enthusiasm for energy security and national wealth assured by the oil 
sands still exceeded Alberta envy or the green campaign to crush their 
development (FP2). 
3. Critical of the term being applied to Canada (6 articles) 
The root of this criticism varied depending on the article.  A news story in the Globe drew 
attention to the fact that government estimates about future oil sands production varied based 
on whether they were projecting pollution targets or encouraging investment.  Calling out 
Harper’s use of the term as a marketing device, the story concluded that, “(Lunn’s) lowball 
estimate doesn’t square with the Prime Minister Harper’s efforts to tout the country’s potential 
as an energy superpower” (McCarthy, 2007: B3).  A  Globe columnist rejected the idea that oil 
sands could play a large role in solving future oil crisis: 
Prime Minister Harper touts Canada as an “emerging energy superpower” as if it 
were the next OPEC.  It’s a misleading, extravagant, and potentially dangerous 
claim.  Canada will not save the world from oil shortages and the numbers tell 
the story (Reguly, 2007: B7). 
Other commentators questioned whether being an “energy superpower” was fundamentally a 
good thing.  For example writing in the Post, Corcoran (2006) doubted whether pursuing this 
goal was good for the overall health of economy by calling it “the NEP in reverse, an 
encroachment on the rights of all Canadians” (FP15).18
Part 2: Testing the ideas 
  In the Globe, Nikiforuk (2007) 
questioned whether Canada could “defy the axiom of our age” believing that “oil corrupts and 
corrupts absolutely” (A15).  Calling it a “sad commentary,” Crane (2006) lamented in a Star story 
that Harper’s “most important story to tell” was promoting the oil sands  rather than “our 
capacity for innovation” or our “high quality workforce” (A21). 
Behind the use of the term, “energy superpower” is a set of ideas about the role of private 
enterprise in developing oil production capacity, the appropriate role of government in 
controlling a strategic energy resource, and the appropriate place for foreign interests (e.g., the 
U.S. and China) in oil sands development. This next section tests four hypotheses to discover 
whether the media embraced these underlying concepts. 
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H1: The newspapers will present the oil sands as a good place to invest; and 
H2: The newspapers will embrace the role of the private sector in the 
development of the oil sands. 
Energy security frame: 
H3: To enhance their energy security, the US needs to reduce its reliance on oil from 
unstable suppliers.  Canadian oil is well positioned to help reduce this dependency. As 
such, the newspapers will present the U.S. as the natural market for oil sands 
production; and 
H4: Canada could reduce its reliance on the US market by expanding exports to China.  
However, the involvement of Chinese state-owned firms may remove oil from a 
competitive marketplace.  As such, China will represent a conundrum for the media. 
Each section begins with an overview of the basic findings under each frame. 
The economic frame 
Not surprising given its predominance in the business section, all three newspapers 
overwhelming framed the oil sands story as an economic story (see Table 1).  Although the 
National Post was  more likely to run an economic story than the Globe and Mail  and the 
Toronto Star, the rank order of the various frames did not differ between newspapers – 
environmental (2nd), energy security (3rd), and social frame (4th).  
Table 1:  Main frame of the story by newspaper 
 Globe and Mail National Post Toronto Star Total 
Economic 231 (70%) 236 (82%) 40 (61%) 507 (74%) 
Environmental 50 (15%) 21 (7%) 21 (32%) 92 (14%) 
Energy security 22 (7%) 17 (6%) 2 (3%) 41 (6%) 
Social 10 (3%) 6 (2%) 2 (3%) 18 (3%) 
Other 18 (5%) 7 (2%) 1 (2%) 26 (4%) 
Total 331            287 66 684 
 
Expansion plans of oil sands companies/pipeline companies, whether through expansion of their 
own facilities or through buying out or forming partnerships with other companies, dominated 
the economic news frame (see Table 2).   
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Due to rising oil prices/profits and the maturing of the industry, many, including the Alberta and 
federal governments, examined whether the preferential treatments (e.g., low royalty rates, the 
accelerated capital cost allowance) were still necessary.  This debate was captured in the third 
most prevalent category – government take.   Tied for third place in both the Post and the Star, 
was the rising costs associated with the inflationary pressures of the boom.  
Given the predominance of the economic frame, which essentially casts a “business filter”, it is 
not surprising, that these newspapers have embraced the role of the market led by private oil 
companies. 
Table 2: Economic frame – specific emphasis by newspaper 
 Globe and Mail National Post Toronto Star Total 
Expansion of oil sands sites 
and related facilities 
41 (18%) 51 (22%) 17 (43%) 109 (22%) 
Mergers, acquisitions, joint 
partnerships 
55 (24%) 42 (18%) 7(18%) 104 (21%) 
“Government take” 32 (14%) 29 (12%) 3 (8%) 64 (13%) 
Business costs associated 
with development 
23 (10%) 27(11%) 3 (8%) 53 (10%) 
Workers (e.g., issues 
associated with their 
recruitment & retention) 
15 (7%) 27 (11%) 1 (3%) 43 (9%) 
Distribution to market 
(pipelines, shipping etc.) 
27 (12%) 5 (2%) 1 (3%) 33 (7%) 
Investment climate 7 (3%) 20 (8%) 1 (3%) 28 (6%) 
Impact on other industries 
or regions 
4 (2%) 5(2%) 2 (5%) 11 (2%) 
Profits to oil sands 
companies 
3 (1%) 0 (0%) 5 (13%) 8 (2%) 
Other economic issues 24 (10%) 30 (13%) 0 (0%) 54 (11%) 
Total 231 236 40 507 
 
H1: The newspapers will present the oil sands as a good place to invest 
In his “energy superpower” speeches, Harper actively promoted the oil sands, as a good place to 
invest.  One expects that all three newspapers would embrace this claim.  Content analysis 
demonstrated that when the Globe and Mail or the National Post wavered from a neutral or 
balanced stance, they were far more likely to portray investment decisions (expansions of 
facilities, mergers or acquisitions, or general investment climate) positively than negatively as 
Table 3 demonstrates.  Although a smaller data set at 25 articles, it is important to note that the 
majority of Toronto Star articles in this subset were positive, further evidence that the major 
newspapers embraced this idea. 
  Canadian Political Science Review 5(1) January 2011 
 
 An energy superpower or a super sales pitch?  (74-98)  
  
85
Table 3:  Newspapers portrayal of investment decisions in the oil sands 
 Globe and Mail National Post Toronto Star Total 
Positive 38 (37%) 42 (37%) 14 (56%) 94 (39%) 
Negative 7 (7%) 7 (6%) 1 (4%) 15 (6%) 
Neutral 58 (56%) 64 (56%) 10 (40%) 132 (55%) 
Total 103 113 25 241 
 
A good example of the news media embracing the argument that Canada remains the last “safe” 
place to invest was the inclusion of quotes like the following by Jeff Rubin of CIBC World 
markets: 
The Canadian oil sands, as the single most important energy asset in the world 
open to private capital, its ownership will reflect the global oil industry. And the 
process in which the global oil industry is going to assert ownership over that 
sector is by buying out the people who own it now (Parkinson, 2007: B10).19
Or this one from the manager of Salida, a hedge fund, “with Shell's bid for Shell Canada, 
I think everyone on the planet now has an idea of what the oil sands is worth to the 
majors - its really about big reserves in a secure part of the world” (Harding, Jon, 2006: 
FP5). 
 
Neutral stories were unlikely to deny the basic premise that Canada currently represents the 
best place for energy companies to invest.  However, these stories tempered this enthusiasm by 
referring to the current challenges (e.g., high cost overruns, a shortage of skilled labour) which 
could affect the industry’s ability to deliver the expected production increases on time and on 
budget.  It is important to note that sometimes a negative tone was in the best interest of the oil 
sands companies as Taylor (2007) cheekily pointed out in the lead paragraph of his column: 
Pity Alberta’s oil sands producers. It must be hard for them to know 
which hat they’re wearing, the snazzy Stetson they don when they tell 
investors how rich they are or the beggar’s cap they hold out when they 
argue against paying higher economic rents (B11). 
H2: The newspapers will embrace the role of the private sector in the development of the 
oil sands. 
Hester argues that one of the main problems with Canada achieving “energy superpower” 
status is that the government has divested substantial control to the private sector.   Since the 
news media tends to embrace the private market, one expects that the newspapers would 
reject Hester’s assumption that a lack of government control is a problem by embracing either a 
pro-business stance or conversely an anti-government intervention stance. 
The three newspapers’ positive orientation towards the private market is not surprising given 
that the majority of first and second sources represented business interests, as Table 4 
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Table 4:  Selected first and second sources by newspaper (all frames)* 
  Classic “opponents” to business fell far below as the media rarely used 
environmental and labour groups as their primary sources.  Perhaps more surprising is how 
infrequently government sources (both elected and departmental) were quoted despite two 
broad-based provincial reviews and changes to the federal fiscal and environmental policies.  
Business concerns and perspectives about the state of the industry clearly dominated Canada’s 
major English newspapers. 
 Globe and Mail National Post Toronto Star 
1st source 2nd source 1st source 2nd source 1st source 2nd source 
Business 181 (57%)  133 (53%) 179 (64%)  142 (68%) 38 (62%) 18 (50%) 
Provincial 
government 
17 (5%) 17 (7%) 9 (3%) 7 (3%) 1 (2%) 1 (3%) 
Federal government 16 (5%) 12 (5%) 9 (3%) 8 (4%) 5 (8%) 5 (14%) 
Environmental 
groups 
9 (3%) 12 (5%) 2 (1%) 3 (1%) 3 (5%) 3 (8%) 
Labour/workers 7 (2%) 4 (2%) 8 (3%) 7 (3%)  0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
* of stories with sources 
 
During the study period, both the federal and provincial governments were seen to be exerting, 
at least rhetorically, a more interventionist stance particularly in terms of increasing overall 
government take – provincially in regards to royalties and federally in regards to elimination of 
corporate tax exemption for income trusts and the elimination of the accelerated capital cost 
allowance.  When the newspapers wavered from their neutral stance, they were far more likely 
to portray these decisions as negative towards oil sands development – as such embracing a 
business perspective (see Table 5).  The business perspective was that government should not 
change the “rules of the game” after investment decisions were made and that businesses not 
government should decide the “pace” of development.  Whereas, positive portrayals included 
views that these new measures would help government “get their fair share,” would reduce the 
downsides of runaway growth, or were no longer necessary given the industry’s strength. 
Table 5: Overall story perspective where government take is the focus 
 Government take – provincial  Government take – federal 
Globe  Post Star Globe   Post Star 
Positive 1 (4%) 1 (4%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Negative 7 (29%) 7 (29%) 1 (100%) 3 (38%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Neutral 16 (67%) 16 (67%) 0 5 (63%) 4 (100%) 2 (100%) 
Total 24 24 1 8 4 2 
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However, there were differences between the national newspapers when examining their 
editorial stance, with the Post adopting a stronger pro-business stance than the Globe21
Royalties hike would kill ‘golden goose’; Report on oil sands; Klein warns against 
change made on whim (Cattaneo and Harding, 2007: A1). 
. 
Whereas, the Post (2007: A16) warned that Alberta could risk the country’s financial health by 
this proposed “cash grab,” the Globe (2007) “congratulated (Stelmach) on his quest to get a 
bigger deal” and blamed the previous government’s “unlimited development” stance for 
numerous problems facing the industry today (A18).  In addition, while all three papers reported 
how energy stocks fell immediately after the release, only the Post ran a front-page story, which 
had this inflammatory headline:  
Although one can discern a favourable bias towards the interest of business, this is not 
to suggest that opposing voices were absent altogether, only that the news media 
minimized them.  For example, Brian Mason, the leader of the Alberta NDP, responding 
to yet another  approval of a oil sands project, was quoted as saying, “the tar sands 
development strategy being followed by the Alberta government is not in the interests 
of Albertans, it is in the interests of the oil industry” (Ebner, 2007: B5). 
Energy security frame 
The global reserves/production category captured news stories, which addressed oil sands 
contribution (or lack of it) to current and future global reserves.  It is not surprising that Chinese 
energy security figured predominately in the national newspapers (36% in the Globe and 29% in 
the Post) as the media addressed questions of whether Chinese interest was real and welcome 
by Canada.  Meeting American energy needs received only minor attention. However, this frame 
does not capture the extent of the U.S./Canada relationship over energy.  For example, 
decisions by individual companies to build refining capacity in the U.S. as opposed to Canada 
were captured in the economic frame.  The three articles examining Canadian energy security 
challenged Canada’s ability to meet its own energy needs given its trade relationship with the 
U.S.  The other category captured countries, like South Korea or India, and their interest in the 
oil sands or the competition between American and Chinese interests.     
Table 6: Energy security frame – specific emphasis by newspaper 
 Globe and Mail National Post Toronto Star Total 
Global reserves/ 
production 
6 (27%) 7 (41%) 0 (0%) 13 (32%) 
Chinese energy security 6 (27%) 5 (29%) 0 (0%) 11 (27%) 
American energy security 1 (5%) 3 (18%) 0 (0%) 4 (10%) 
Canadian energy security 1 (5%) 0 (0%) 1 (50%) 2 (5%) 
Energy security, other 8 (36%) 2 (12%) 1 (50%) 11 (27%) 
Total 22   17 2 41 
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H3: To enhance their energy security, the US needs to reduce its reliance on oil from unstable 
suppliers.  Canadian oil is well positioned to help reduce this dependency. As such, the national 
newspapers will present the U.S. as the natural market for oil sands production. 
Harper views Canada’s status as the biggest supplier of crude to the U.S as evidence of our new 
and increasing sphere of influence. However, Hester and other critics view the Canada/U.S. 
energy trade relationship as problematic because NAFTA’s proportionality clause limits Canada’s 
range of policy tools and therefore, its ability to transfer this new-found status to political power 
is limited.  Two commentaries, one in the Globe and another in the Star essentially reproduced 
this argument.  Gordon Laxer (2006) lamented Canada’s failure to develop its own energy policy 
and rhetorically asks, “If there are energy shortages, in which of the three NAFTA countries are 
citizens most likely to freeze in the dark?” (A15).  In the 1980s energy crisis, Alberta residents, 
angry at Trudeau’s National Energy program, had bumper stickers “Let the Eastern bastards 
freeze in the dark.”  The joke, according to Laxer, is now on all of Canada, including Alberta, who 
will freeze in the dark, because NAFTA’s proportionality clause binds Canada to export the 
majority of its oil to the U.S.  Laxer’s solution is for Canada to create a new energy strategy but 
in order to do this Canada must first either re-negotiate this specific clause or leave NAFTA 
altogether.   The Star piece, also written by Laxer in conjunction with Tony Clarke and Bruce 
Campbell, identified Canada as an “energy satellite of the U.S.” not as an “energy superpower.”   
These opinion pieces are representative of a marginalized perspective and as such, do not 
seriously challenge the perspective that the U.S. is the natural market for Canada’s energy 
resources.  
In the four articles directly focusing on oil sands as part of the solution to American energy 
needs, the oil sands were perceived as reducing America’s dependence on foreign (e.g., non-
North American) energy supplies.  The following blunt quote from Irving Mintzer, a “leading 
American energy consultant” highlights this perspective perfectly:  
They (Congressmen) see the oil sands as quid pro quo: You give us unfettered access to 
the oil sands; we give you a guaranteed market.  We'll also throw in a freebie: 
continental security, care of the Pentagon (Reguly, 2006: 19).  
 Another story highlights the U.S. Energy Secretary’s meeting with oil sands producers to reduce 
barriers for growth (Harding, 2006b: FP5).  Underlying these stories was the assumption that oil 
sands sector’s interest in a large insatiable close market was aligned with American interest (i.e., 
a secure and close supply).  There was no indication in these stories that playing this role may 
jeopardize other Canadian interests. 
However, the Canada/U.S. relationship is more complicated than a review of just energy security 
stories would suggest.  To get a better understanding of how the Canadian newspapers perceive 
this relationship, one needs to also briefly examine four other news events. (1) In October 2005, 
Natural Resource Minister, John McCallum, promoted the growth of oil sands exports (400,000 
barrels a day)22 to China as a means of diversifying Canada’s energy sales.  This was perceived in 
the Globe as a “warning” to the Americans over the softwood lumber dispute in a front page 
news article (York, 2005: A1) and the editorial board came out in support of this new aggressive 
strategy.23  This “linking” of issues was later rebuked in two subsequent news stories in the 
Globe.  Here is an instance where the Canadian government was attempting to act as an energy 
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superpower by using its energy resources to gain an advantage on another foreign policy 
objective.  It was short lived and ultimately provided additional opportunity to assert the 
dominant view that Ottawa should not control where Alberta/oil companies send their oil.  (2) 
During this time period, multiple competing pipeline proposals were being developed.  When 
talks stalled between Enbridge and Chinese refiners to develop a pipeline to the west coast and 
Enbridge reached a deal with Exxon to send the equivalent amount to Texas, the outcome was 
applauded by an industry observer: “this continent needs more oil than it produces – it should 
not be shipping crude overseas” (Ebner, 2007b: B1).  Whether Chinese investment was 
welcomed is the focus of the next section.  In September 2006, BP announced it would upgrade 
refineries in the U.S. to handle oil sands crude.  Critics saw this as an export of value-added jobs.  
However, both the Globe’s and Post’s stories on this event marginalized and minimized this 
criticism by limiting their coverage.  The Globe’s Ebner (2006b) wrote, “the prospect of EnCana 
refining its oil sands output in the U.S. has raised some questions in Alberta about shipping away 
the province’s raw materials” but then subsequently quoted the Canadian Association of 
Petroleum Producers as saying this was not a large problem.  Likewise, the Post repeated the 
exact same format – a brief statement about criticism followed by the rebuttal from CAPP 
(Cattaneo and Harding, 2006: FP6). (4) The amount of greenhouse gases produced by the oil 
sands is a source of friction in the relationship as news stories on California’s low emission law 
demonstrate.  The stories did not present the law as an immediate threat to the oil sands, given 
the fact that California receives little oil from Canada, but concluded that if “snowballing” of the 
law to other states occurs, this could be quite costly (Mittelstaedt, 2007; McKenna, 2007).  What 
is important is that both stories, including one written by an environmental reporter, framed the 
issue as a possible barrier to exporting oil sands to the U.S. rather than examining the merits of 
the law.  
The media routinely confirmed, directly and indirectly, the idea that the United States is the 
natural market for oil sands production and that government (either Canada or the U.S.) should 
not take actions, which would disrupt this trade flow.  Contrary voices were not absent but were 
marginalized. 
H4: Canada could reduce its reliance on the US market by expanding exports to China.  However, 
involvement of Chinese state-owned firms may remove oil from a competitive marketplace.  As 
such, China will represent a conundrum for the media. 
Under a completely free market, all investment interest would be welcome.  As well, Hester 
argues that dependence on a single market binds the producer as much as the buyer.  She 
argues that Russia is not a “global energy superpower” because it is reliant on one market – 
Europe.  Therefore, for Canada to achieve “energy superpower” status a diversification of 
markets would be ideal.  One would expect that the media would positively view a 
diversification of markets for oil sands production.  However, investment by state-owned firms, 
particularly by China, is problematic.  The concern is that these firms do not operate under 
“normal” market conditions and could potentially take the oil off the market.  It also challenges 
the perceived interests of the oil sands largest market and closest neighbour – the U.S.  As such, 
I would expect to find both positive and negative references to China’s interest (or potential) in 
the oil sands.24 
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Under the energy security frame, 11 stories examined Chinese interest in the oil sands and 
another three focused on perceived “competition” between Chinese and American interests.  
These articles are grouped into four clusters: 
1. Chinese investment was never really on the table (4 articles). 
2. Chinese takeovers should be prevented (3 articles). 
3. Alberta/Canada is “open for business” from China (4 articles). 
4. Chinese investment threatens U.S. interests (3 articles). 
 
1. Chinese investment was never really on the table (4 articles). 
In an in-depth article, entitled “Chinese invasion just passing through”, Harding and Cattaneo 
(2006b) concluded that Chinese investment failed to materialize because neither party was truly 
interested.  First, oil sands companies’ preferred market was and continues to be the American 
market and once the Americans “responded”, there was no need to enter into agreements with 
the Chinese (FP1).  Second, the Chinese did not want to risk the problems associated “with them 
coming to America’s backyard” (Ibid).  What is key about this article is that it placed the strategic 
decision of expanding beyond the American market squarely outside the realm of the Canadian 
government.  By placing politicians outside the frame, clearly, this article did not conceive 
Canada as acting as “energy superpower.”  Canadian governments were only mentioned in the 
following paragraph:  
While some are not ruling out future Chinese investment, and politicians from 
Alberta and Ottawa are now in China talking up the oil sands, it looks like the 
Chinese won’t have access to Canadian oil for a long time, likely not before the 
next spurt of oil sands production growth, perhaps in 2015 and beyond (Ibid). 
In other articles, a Chinese state company complained that it received a chilly reception from oil 
sands producers and the Conservative government (Harding, 2007; Scott, 2007; Ebner, 2006c).  
As such, a widespread investment by the Chinese was never really on the table but was just 
hype. 
2. Chinese takeovers should be prevented (3 articles) 
Under this grouping, articles highlighted reasons why Chinese takeovers are fundamentally 
different from other foreign takeovers with the subtext being that Chinese takeovers should not 
be allowed to occur (for example, some worry that Chinese oil sands production would not be 
available for sale on the world market but would enter a closed system).  Calling their 
involvement to date, “passive,” Reguly (2006b) warned that the Canadian government should 
set the rules now to minimize political damage (B2).  Foster (2006) reiterated this message when 
he argued that government asserting control through state-owned companies was causing 
instability and used Russia as an example (FP22).  As such, the Canadian government should not 
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permit takeovers by Chinese companies but he found that the government was sending mixed 
messages on this issue (Ibid).  
3. Alberta/Canada is “open for business” from China (4 articles) 
Chinese investment, while small, was growing.  Several articles detailed this growth but did not 
present it as a problem.  For example, in the two articles reporting the acquisition of relatively 
small oil sands leases directly by a Chinese state oil company, the underlying message was that 
“the Alberta government is open for business.”  Chinese companies will follow “the rules” like 
any other company (Scott, 2007b; Jaremko, 2007).  While other articles examined Canadian 
government efforts to promote the oil sands in China or proclaimed that Canada was open to all 
investment (Chase, 2007; York, 2007). 
4. Chinese investment threatens U.S. interests (3 articles) 
China’s involvement in the oil sands was most often perceived in the media as a challenge not to 
Canada but to the United States where it was seen as a “provocation” to and a “competition” 
with American interests” (Ebner, 2007b and 2006d; Reguly, 2006b).  
This review demonstrates that media embraced several conflicting perspectives due to their 
uncertainty over how to frame the Chinese involvement.  Under the rubric that the oil sands are 
a great place for the world to invest, the media embraced potential Chinese investment.  When 
large-scale investment appeared to be forthcoming either through a westerly pipeline or a 
takeover of a dominate player, the media questioned whether the Chinese investment was in 
fact something which should be prevented as these actions were seen to interfere with the 
accepted norm that the private sector should lead the development.25
Conclusion 
  Chinese investment was 
largely seen as threatening American energy security and as such would affect us only indirectly 
from the fallout from the Americans.  Lastly, the national newspapers, which had previously 
worried about or welcomed Chinese investment, changed their story to conclude that the 
pending Chinese “invasion” was more hype than reality. 
In only a small number of instances did the national newspapers, the Globe and Mail and the 
National Post, or Canada’s largest paper, the Toronto Star, use the “energy superpower” term in 
news stories, commentaries, or editorials that focused on the Alberta oil sands.  This small 
subset of articles was roughly evenly split between those, which dismissed the idea as 
misleading or inherently negative, and those, which were supportive of Harper’s goal of 
becoming an energy superpower.  However, it would be a mistake to conclude that the media 
failed to embrace Harper’s oil sands frame.  When examining Harper’s speeches, his primary 
goal was to market the oil sands as place for safe, reliable investment.  In doing so, he implicitly 
contrasted Canada to other oil producing countries, like Russia and Venezuela, which had 
recently taken aggressive steps to reassert more state control.  All three newspapers embraced 
the Prime Minister’s contention that private oil companies, and not a more activist state, 
should/would lead oil sands development.  Evidence of this is their overwhelming adoption of 
an economic frame and their placement of business actors as their primary sources.  One saw 
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little evidence that the newspapers perceived Canada’s divestment of control to the private 
sector as problematic.  All three papers did perceive the oil sands as a good place to invest and 
often applied a “business filter” when examining the proposed changes by both levels of 
government to the fiscal regime governing oil sands development. In addition, the media often 
reinforced the idea that the U.S. was the natural market for Canada’s oil sands crude.  During 
the study period, Chinese investment received a “lukewarm” response as the media largely 
rejected the idea that Canada needed to diversify its markets.  Other perspectives were present 
in national newspapers but their voices were largely silenced by sheer dominance of an 
economic frame told by business actors.  With very few exceptions, it is possible to conclude 
that the media would largely reject the steps that the Canadian government would need to take 
in order to make Canada an “energy superpower.”  
Endnotes 
 
1  The author would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their comments, as well as Dr. Ian Urquhart and 
Dr. Linda Trimble for their earlier feedback.  
2  There are two primary methods for extracting bitumen (10-12%) from its surrounding material (quartz sand 
(70%), water (3-5%) while the remainder consists of other inorganic material) (Urquhart, 2004: 3). For those 
deposits located close to the surface, open pit mining is used.  For deeper deposits, producers use an in-situ 
process, which separates the oil from the sand underground by injecting steam.  For a full description of both 
processes, see the pamphlet, Canada’s Oil Sands (July 2006) produced by Canadian Centre for Energy 
Information.  Some oil sands companies are even investigating ways to separate bitumen from limestone 
deposits. 
3  The greenhouse gas emissions are two to three times higher than conventional oil production however others 
argued that when applying a full life cycle accounting, oil sands are only 5 to 15 percent higher (IHS CERA, 2009: 
ES-4). 
4  Harper was not the first Canadian government official to link the concept of “superpower” to our natural 
resources.  For example, Raymond Chrétien, Canada’s former ambassador to France, connected the two ideas in 
a speech he gave in 2001- “our natural resources, Canada is indeed a superpower in this regard” following 
which he made referenced not only to the oil sands but also to other non-energy resources like water and 
forests. 
5  Initially, the federal government retained authority and management over the oil sands when they formed the 
province of Alberta in 1906.  It was not until 1930 when the federal government transferred authority over 
natural resources to the province but even then, they retained control over 5,000 square kilometres, which 
included the Athabasca oil sands deposit (Chastko, 2004:  21).  The federal government did not transferred to 
the province of Alberta until after WWII.   
6  Pigeon (2003) defines a tax expenditure “as the deviation between the actual tax system and a 
benchmark…system (with the benchmark being defined as) a ‘neutral’ tax system that does not favour one 
industry over another” (1). 
7  Kyoto would be a “non-event” with cost estimates at under 30 cents a barrel (Urquhart, 2004: 16).  
8  In 2004, the federal government sold off its last remaining stake (19% ownership) in PetroCanada. 
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9  The Investment Canada Act gives the authority to the Minister of Industry to review the sale of Canadian 
companies to state-owned enterprises to determine whether there is a “net benefit” to Canada.  The federal 
government must be convinced that the company will still operate on a commercial basis including factors like 
“where to export” and “where to process” (Industry Canada, 2009). 
10  In June 2007, Statoil purchased North American Oil Sands Corp for $2.2 billion.  There was no opposition to this 
takeover. 
11  Operations will remain in Canadian hands and there is no requirement to sell the oil to the Chinese 
(Vanderklippe, 2009: B1).   
12  For example, Sinopec, through its Canadian subsidiary, initially brought a 40% stake in Northern Lights Project, 
approx 1 billion barrels, in 2005 and then increased its share to 50% in 2009.  Total SA now owns the other 50% 
(Total, 2009). 
13  For example, the Canadian Energy Research Institute (2006) estimated that 44% of employment generated by 
the oil sands would occur outside Alberta: 27% in other provinces and 17% internationally. 
14  All coding was conducted by me.  To ensure accuracy, I trained a cross-coder to randomly select and code 20 
percent of the stories.  To determine inter-coder reliability, I used the number of questions in agreement 
divided by the total number questions producing the following results:  96 percent for the Globe and Mail, 96 
percent for the National Post, 97 percent for the Toronto Star.  The coding frame is available from the author 
upon request. 
15  News stories were identified using Factiva, which defines the lead paragraph as the first two paragraphs.  
16  In October 2005, the Klein government proposed reserving the vast area of north-eastern Alberta for the 
exclusive use of oil sands development.  Facing widespread public outcry, the Klein government created a 
multistakeholder committee to review all aspects of development.  Subsequently, the new Alberta Premier, Ed 
Stelmach launched a second review to look exclusively at royalty rates.  The multistakeholder committee 
reported in June 2007 and the royalty review in October 2007.  This paper is part of a larger study examining the 
range of media coverage during this period.  
17  In case of multiple reporters, the sex of the first reporter is coded. 
18  The paper reproduced part of Harper’s London speech dealing with “emerging energy superpower” on the same 
page as this article. 
19  This news story did not contain any other sources and essentially repeated Rubin’s bullish forecast for the 
industry made at an investor conference. 
20  Included in this category are the following sub categories: oil sands companies/energy industry, pipeline 
companies, business analysts or associations, and the investor category.  This number is likely slightly higher as 
some businesses were categorized under other – for example, Finning which provides heavy equipment to oil 
sands companies. 
21  This study’s key words did not capture any editorials in the Toronto Star on this subject matter.  
22  The amount is equal to proposed capacity of Enbridge’s Gateway pipeline to BC west coast. 
23  No National Post or Toronto Star stories were captured in the data set on this issue.  
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24  This trend continued in 2009. News coverage about PetroChina’s 2009 $1.9 billion purchase in both the Globe 
and the Post received both positive (renewed investor confidence after 2008 crash) and negative (US negative 
reaction over increased Chinese presence in their ‘backyard) commentaries (McCarthy, 2009; Vanderklippe, 
2009; Martin, 2009) 
25  When a larger scale investment did occur in 2009, the media noted that for the most part the international 
subsidiaries of Chinese oil companies operate like any global oil company, thereby largely capturing them within 
a private sector discourse (McCarthy, 2009:B1). 
Works Cited 
Abu-Laban, Yasmeen and Judith Garber.  2005.  “The Construction of the Geography of Immigration as a Policy 
Problem: The United States and Canada Compared.”  Urban Affairs Review 40(4): 520-561. 
Burnham, Peter, Karin Gillan, Wyn Grant and Zig Layton-Henry.  2004.  Research Methods in Political Science.  New 
York: Palgrave MacMillan. 
Cattaneo, Claudia.  2007a. “Hands off the oilsands,” National Post, January 23, FP2. 
Cattaneo, Claudia.  2007b. “Tory green plan will kill oilsands,” National Post, March 27, FP2. 
Cattaneo, Claudia and Jon Harding.  2007.  “Royalties hike would kill golden goose; Report on oilsands; Klein warns 
against change made on a ‘whim,’”  National Post, September 20: A1. 
Cattaneo, Claudia and Jon Harding. 2006. “BP refinery upgrade to cost US$3B: Oilsands deals are key.”  National Post, 
September 21, FP6. 
Cattaneo, Claudia and Jon Harding.  2006b. “Chinese investment just passing through.”  National Post, November 17, 
FP1. 
Chase, Steven. 2007.  “Bernier rejects Beijing’s criticism of Canada; Minister suggests market factors, not Ottawa are 
behind PetroChina’s decision to pull out of oil sands Gateway pipeline project.”  Globe and Mail, July 14: B6. 
Chastko, Paul.  2004.  Developing Alberta’s Oil sands from Karl Clark to Kyoto.  Calgary: University of Calgary Press. 
Chrétien, Raymond.  2001.  “Canada and the Americas.” Address by Mr. Raymond Chretien  
Canadian Ambassador to France to the Cercle Richelieu Senghor, Paris, 15 March. http://www.dfait-
maeci.gc.ca/missions/eU-UE/offices-bureaux/speech_oct-2007_discours-eng.asp (accessed 3, June 2009). 
Clarke, Tony.  2009.  Tar sands showdown: Canada and the new politics of oil in an age of climate change.  Toronto: 
Lormier. 
Corcoran, Terrence.  2006.  “Bigger than the pyramids!: Harper’s wild plan to make Canada an energy superpower,’” 
National Post, July 29: FP15. 
Ebner, Dave.  2007.  “Imperial Oil’s Kearl Project gets green light; Alberta approves third major oil sands project in 
four months,” Globe and Mail, March 1, B5. 
Ebner, Dave.  2007b. “Enbridge, Exxon forge link to Texas refineries.”  Globe and Mail, June 6: B1. 
Ebner, Dave.  2006. “Edwards sees threat to oil sands project,” Globe and Mail, September 22, B1. 
 
  Canadian Political Science Review 5(1) January 2011 
 




Ebner, Dave.  2006b. “BP to spend heavily in U.S. to handle oil sands crude; Idea stokes speculation about EnCana 
deal.”  Globe and Mail, September 21, B7. 
Ebner, Dave.  2006c. “Enbridge wants to pipe crude to Houston; Eyes plan to build $3.6 billion line to carry oil sands 
output southward.”  Globe and Mail, July 7, B3. 
Ebner, Dave.  2006d. “Survey predicts more energy asset deals; U.S., China seen buying into Canada.”  Globe and Mail, 
January 11, B5. 
Environment Canada.  2007.  “Canada’s national circumstances and greenhouse gas emission trends.”  In A climate 
change plan for the purposes of the Kyoto Protocol Implementation Act -2007.  http://www.ec.gc.ca/doc/ed-
es/p_123/s2_eng.htm (accessed 3, June 2009). 
Foster, Peter.  2006.  “The China Principle.”  National Post, November 29, FP22. 
Government of Alberta.  2009.  “Alberta oil sands: Facts and stats”  http://oilsands.alberta.ca/519.cfm (accessed 3, 
June 2009). 
Globe and Mail.  2007.  “Toward a new oil regime.”  Globe and Mail, September 24, A18. 
Hackett, Robert and Richard Gruneau with Donald Gutstein, Timonty Gibson and NewsWatch  
Canada.  2000.  The Missing News: Filters and Blind Spots in Canada’s Press.  Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Policy 
Alternatives and Garamond Press. 
Harding, Jon.  2007.  “CNPC shuns Canada for ‘friendly’ Venezuela.”  National Post, July 13: FP1. 
Harding, Jon.  2007b. “Ottawa piles more pain on oilpatch: Loss of tax break expected to add $1 a barrel to costs,”  
National Post, FP1. 
Harding, Jon.  2006.  “Shell may get Western: Hedge fund sees payoff.”  National Post, October 27, FP5. 
Harding, Jon.  2006b. “U.S. eager for more output from oilsands: Promises assistance: Energy Secretary says U.S. will 
help to remove barriers.”  National Post, July 15: FP5 
Harper, Stephen.  2010.  PM announces support for wind energy project in Prince Edward Island,  20, August.  
http://news.gc.ca/web/article-eng.do?m=index&nid=554689 (accessed 1, October, 2010). 
Harper, Stephen.  2008. Prime Minister Harper address the Canada-UK Chamber of Commerce in London, 29, May.  
http://pm.gc.ca/media.asp?id=2131 (accessed 2, June 2009). 
Harper, Stephen.  2007a.  Notes for an address by the Right Honourable Stephen Harper, Prime Minister of Canada to 
the APEC Business Summit, Sydney Australia, 7 September.  http://pm.gc.ca/media.asp?=1814 (accessed 2, June 
2009). 
Harper, Stephen.  2007b.  Prime Minister Stephen Harper calls for International consensus on climate change, Berlin 
German, 4, June. http://pm.gc.ca/media.asp?=1681 (accessed 2, June 2009). 
Harper, Stephen.  2007c. Prime Minister Harper outlines agenda for a stronger, safer, better Canada, Ottawa, 6 
February.  http://pm.gc.ca/media.asp?=1522 (accessed 2 June 2009). 
Harper, Stephen.  2006a.  Speech to the Economic Club of New York, New York City, 20 September.  
http://pm.gc.ca/media.asp?=1327.  (accessed 2 June 2009). 
 
  Canadian Political Science Review 5(1) January 2011 
 




Harper, Stephen.  2006b.  Address by the Prime Minister at the Canada-UK Chamber of Commerce, London, UK, 14 
July.  http://pm.gc.ca/media.asp?=1247 (accessed 2 June 2009). 
Hester, Annette. 2007.  Canada as the “Emerging Energy Superpower”: Testing the Case.  A paper prepared for the 
Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute 
House of Commons.  2007.  The Oil Sands: Toward Sustainable Development: Report of the Standing Committee on 
Natural Resources.  Ottawa: Communications Canada – Publishing. 
IHS Cambridge Energy Associates.  2009.  Growth in the Canadian Oil Sands: Finding the New Balance.  
http://www2.cera.com/Oil_Sands_Full_Report.pdf (accessed 11 August 2009). 
Investment Canada.  2006.  Investment Canada Act Guidelines – Investment by state-owned enterprises – Net benefit 
assessment. http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/icalic.nsf/eng/lk00064.html, (accessed 6 July 2009). 
Jaremko, Gordon.  2007.  “Chinese buys oilsands leases.”  National Post, June 22, FP2. 
Laxer, Gordon.  2006.  “Fuel this debate: our energy security.”  Globe and Mail, January 6, A15. 
Lorimer, Rowland, Mike Gasher, and David Skinner.  2008.  Mass Communication in Canada, 6th edition.  Don Mills: 
Oxford University Press. 
Lunn, Gary.  2008.  Transcript of a speech by the Honourable Gary Lunn, P.C., M.P. Minister of Natural Resources to 
the Newfound and Labrador Oil and Gas Industries Association 2008 Annual Conference, St John’s 
Newfoundland, 19 June.  http://www.nrcan.gc.ca/media/spedis/2008/200848-eng.php (accessed 2 June 2009). 
Lunn, Gary.  2007a.  Notes for a speech by the Honourable Gary Lunn, P.C., M.P. Minister of Natural Resources to the 
2007 International Security Pipeline Forum, Ottawa Ontario, 24 October.  
http://www.nrcan.gc.ca/media/spedis/2007/2007118-eng.php. (accessed 2 June 2009). 
Lunn, Gary.  2007b.  Notes for a speech by the Honourable Gary Lunn, P.C., M.P. Minister of Natural Resources to the 
Fifth Annual TD Oil Sands Forum, Calgary Alberta, 12, July.  
http://www.nrcan.gc.ca/media/spedis/2007/200764-eng.php (accessed 2 June 2009). 
Lunn, Gary.  2007c.  Notes for a speech by the Honourable Gary Lunn, P.C., M.P. Minister of Natural Resources at the 
Economic Club of Toronto, Toronto Ontario, 23 January.  http://www.nrcan.gc.ca/media/spedis/2007/200708-
eng.php (accessed 2 June 2009). 
Lunn, Gary.  2006.  Minster Lunn puts spotlight on Canada as Energy superpower.  The Newsroom, Edmonton, 19 July 
http://www.nrcan.gc.ca/media/newcom/2006/200621-eng.php (accessed 2 June 2009). 
Martin, Don.  2009.  “China dives into oil sands; Energy source deemed ‘too dirty’ for greenish U.S.”  National Post, 
September 1, A1. 
McCarthy, Shawn.  2009.  “China’s move into oil sands irks Washington.”  Globe and Mail, September 2, B1. 
McCarthy, Shawn.  2007.  “Tories oil sands estimates exceed industry’s; PM, ministers offer varying targets,” Globe 
and Mail, January 30: B3. 
McCarthy, Shawn.  2006.  “Enbridge makes new pitch to Chinese on oil sands stake; Weeks after delaying Gateway 
pipeline, company makes run at possible investors,” Globe and Mail, November 23, B1. 
McKenna, Barrie.  2007.  “U.S. states eye California’s rallying cry; widespread adoption of its fuel standards could hurt 
market for Alberta’s oil sands.”  Globe and Mail, January 12: B6. 
 
  Canadian Political Science Review 5(1) January 2011 
 




Middelstaedt, Martin.  2007.  “Oil sands hit major ‘hurdle’ in California; Alberta’s energy resources at disadvantage 
under state rule limiting greenhouse gases.”  Globe and Mail, January 11, A4. 
Milov, Vladimir.  2007.  “Can Russia become an energy superpower?”  Social Sciences 38(1):23-32. 
Monaghan, Andrew.  2007.  “Russia’s energy diplomacy: A political idea lacking a strategy?”  Southeast European and 
Black Sea Studies 7(2): 275-288. 
National Post.  2007.  “Alberta’s golden goose.”  National Post, October 9, A16. 
Nesbitt-Larking, Paul.  2007.  Politics, Society, and the Media, 2nd edition.  Peterborough: Broadview Press. 
Nikiforuk, Andrew.  2008.  Tar Sands: Dirty Oil and the Future of a continent.  Vancouver: David Suzuki Foundation and 
Greystone Books. 
Nikiforuk, Andrew.  2007. “Is Canada the latest emerging petro-tyranny?” Globe and Mail, June 11, A15. 
Parkinson, David.  2007.  “Oil patch feeding frenzy predicted.”  Globe and Mail, September 7, B10. 
Pigeon, Marc-Andre.  2003.  Tax Incentives and Expenditures Offered to the Oil Sands Industry.  Ottawa: Parliamentary 
Research Branch. 
Pratt, Larry.  2001.  Energy: Free Trade and the Price We Paid.  Edmonton: Parkland Institute. 
Prentice, Jim.  2009.  Notes for an address by the Honourable Jim Prentice, P.C., Q.C., M.P., Minister of the 
Environment to the Americana International Trade Show, 17 March.  
http://www.ec.gc.ca/default.asp?lang=En&n=6F2DE1CA-1&news=FB6FECA6-203B-4708-83D7-E83E1509C165 
(accessed 3, June 2009). 
Reguly, Eric.  2007.  “Oil sands as an industry saviour? The numbers tell the real story,”  Globe and Mail, October 12: 
B7). 
Reguly, Eric.   2006. “Chinaphobia; Americans don’t want China tapping into “their” oil – the stuff in Alberta oil sands 
that is.”  Globe and Mail – Report on Business Magazine, February 24, 19. 
Reguly, Eric.  2006b. “It’s time to plan ahead for China’s big oil sands deal.”  Globe and Mail, April 15, B2. 
Richardson, John E. 2007.  Analysing Newspapers: An Approach from Critical Discourse Analysis. Hampshire and New 
York: Palgrave. 
Rutland, Peter.  2008.  “Russia as an Energy Superpower.”  New Political Economy 13(2)” 203-210. 
Sander-Green, Nadine. 2008.  “CanmetEnergy – A new name and website for an historic energy organization.”  
Natural Elements 30, November http://www.nrcan.gc.ca/elements/issues/30/canmetenergy-eng.php (accessed 
2 June, 2009). 
Scott, Norval.  2007.  “Beijing quits pipeline, blasts Ottawa; China walks away from $4 billion oil-sands project.”  Globe 
and Mail, July 13, A1. 
Scott, Norval.  2007b. “Chinese leases a bit of Alberta’s oil patch; State owned CNPC buys rights to develop oil sands 
properties.”  Globe and Mail, June 22, B2. 
Sherman, Joan and Michael Gismondi.  1997.  “How a Pulp Company Communicates a Green Image: Jock Talk, 
Goldfish, Horse Logging, and Star Wars.”  Alternatives Journal 23(1):14-19. 
 
  Canadian Political Science Review 5(1) January 2011 
 




Simons, Lewis. 1999.  “The State of the American Newspaper: Follow the Money.”  American Journalism Review, 
November: 55-68. 
Taras, David.  2001.  Power and Betrayal in the Canadian Media, 2nd Edition.  Orchard Park: Broadview Press. 
Taylor, Fabrice.  2007.  ‘Its time for Alberta government to draw a line in the oil sands.”  Globe and Mail, September 
28: B11. 
Terkildsen, Nayda and Frauke Schnell.  1997.  “How Media Frames Move Public Opinion: An Analysis of the Women’s 
Movement.”  Political Research Quarterly 50: 879-900. 
Total. 2009.  Canada: Total sells 10% stake in Northern Lights to Sinopec project. http://www.total-ep-
canada.com/press/documents/04-01-09-Canada-cession-Northern-Lights-GB.pdf.  Accessed 11/12/09. 
Trimble, Linda, Natasja Trieberg, and Gabrielle Mason.  2008.  “Beating (Up) the Boys: Newspaper Coverage of Helen 
Clark in New Zealand Elections, 1996 – 2005.” Paper present at the annual meeting of the Canadian Political 
Science, Vancouver. 
Vanderklippe, Nathan. 2009.  “China’s bold move into the oil sands.”  Globe and Mail, September 1, B1. 
van Dijk, Teun. 1991.  Racism and the Press.  London: Routledge. 
York, Geoffrey.  2007.  “Flaherty touts Canada’s stability; Minister says oil sands could help the country’s growing 
appetite for energy.”  Globe and Mail, January 20, B5. 
York, Geoffrey.  2005.  “Oil thirst from China adds fuel to trade tussle; Ottawa touts Beijing’s huge energy needs as 
opportunity to move away from U.S. market.”  Globe and Mail, October 14, A1. 
 
